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NO. 33 MAY 2021 Introduction 
(Not) Lost in Foresight 
Structuring Futures Complexity in a Politically Meaningful Way 
Lars Brozus 
From the perspective of policymakers, planning for the many uncertainties that the 
future brings is a complicated task. Because of the growing complexity of global 
affairs, more and more information is destined to land on the desks of decision makers. 
State-of-the-art futures analysis structures information about conceivable events and 
developments, thus supporting more effective and legitimate anticipatory govern-
ance. Forecasting and foresight, the dominant analytical approaches, serve different 
political functions. Forecasting geopolitical events is primarily relevant for the execu-
tive branch, which must act on short-term assessments. Foresight scenarios, on the 
other hand, significantly contribute to deliberations on the desirability of plausible 
mid- to long-term developments in consultative bodies such as parliaments. Both 
approaches should be utilized in EU policymaking. 
 
Following Jean Monnet’s dictum that Europe 
will be forged in crises, one could argue that 
decisive moments should be seen as impor-
tant drivers of reform and innovation for 
policymaking in the EU. Hence, COVID-19 
could prove to be a crucial disruption that 
heightens political awareness of scientific 
approaches to analyzing the future. The 
implications of the dual crises of global con-
nectivity and global governance that un-
folded due to the pandemic appear poised 
to increase political authorities’ interest in 
concepts and methods that promise to help 
them steer clear of unexpected events of 
comparable magnitude in the future. 
Futures researchers such as forecasters 
and foresighters should prepare for a major 
boost in political demand for their exper-
tise. Indeed, the European Commission is 
already reaching out to them. Here, Vice-
President of the European Commission for 
Interinstitutional Relations and Foresight 
Maroš Šefčovič is responsible for embedding 
strategic foresight within EU policymaking. 
In its first annual Strategic Foresight Report, 
“Charting the Course Towards a More Resili-
ent Europe”, published in September 2020, 
the European Commission emphasizes its 
willingness to build futures-oriented part-
nerships with think tanks and academia as 
well as with civil society. Researchers should 
heed this call and engage, for example, in 
“full foresight cycles” that attempt to main-
stream their insights into the decision mak-
ing processes of European institutions. 
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Certainty vs Contingency: 
The Problem of Gray Swans 
Futures researchers generally embrace the 
contingent character of the many conceiv-
able tomorrows. But they part ways in their 
different approaches to coping with futures 
complexity. Forecasters make probability 
judgments about short-term events that can 
be checked against the unfolding reality in 
due time. This allows for transparent evalu-
ations of the accuracy of these predictions. 
Foresighters, in contrast, create plausible 
scenarios of conceivable mid- to long-term 
developments that primarily serve the pur-
pose of raising awareness of what might lie 
ahead.  
Foresighters and forecasters agree, how-
ever, that many imaginable developments 
can be categorized as so-called gray swans: 
events that are to be expected because of 
their frequent occurrence, such as pandem-
ics, natural disasters, or political crises. 
Still, it is extremely difficult to accurately 
predict when and where the bird will land 
next and what the outcome of its landing 
will be. There was, for instance, no shortage 
of warnings over the past decade about a 
possible global pandemic. COVID-19 is not 
a black swan – that is, a completely un-
expected event. Alas, the warnings proved 
to be too unspecific for policymakers. 
Political authorities crave certainty, 
therefore they frequently complain about 
major surprise disruptions because they 
expect precise and actionable forewarning. 
In a way, this is quite reassuring as their 
anger reflects that hardly any policymaker 
will make decisions lightly in times of crisis. 
Most governments prefer to avoid such situa-
tions because under conditions of uncertain-
ty about future developments poor choices 
are bound to be made. COVID-19 is currently 
the most prominent example of this. 
Following reverse logic, fewer surprises 
would mean more certainty in decision 
making. Accordingly, political authorities 
frequently resort to reasoning based on past 
experience. This convenient way of framing 
the future is reflected in everyday policy-
making practices. Administrations routinely 
engage in incremental planning in terms 
of policy development, programming, and 
budget requirements for the next year, or, 
as is the case for the EU, for multiple years. 
Of course, many decision makers are mind-
ful of the problems that are inherent in 
interpreting the past as prologue to the 
future. In military affairs, the proverbial 
phrase “generals are always prepared to 
fight the last war” – attributed to Winston 
Churchill – exemplifies both this practice 
and its critique.  
What If There Are 
Too Many What Ifs? 
Futures complexity thus collides with every-
day policymaking. A lot of the myriad policy 
proposals, recommendations, and warnings 
that compete for the attention of decision 
makers originate with futures researchers. 
Numerous international organizations, 
research institutes (including SWP), consul-
tancies and think tanks, not to mention 
governmental foresight units, expert coun-
cils and intelligence agencies, are trying to 
make policymakers aware of future risks 
and threats. It is therefore not surprising 
that decision makers, when confronted 
with an ever-growing number of risk assess-
ments, scenarios, early warnings, “What 
ifs…” and “For your eyes only”-reports, start 
saying, “I don’t have the time or resources 
to deal with all these issues simultaneously, 
so I have to set priorities. Can you help me 
with that? But wait, you have been wrong 
before, haven’t you?” 
They have a point. Research has shown 
that experts are not very good at accurately 
predicting political events in the future. 
Of course, foresighters and forecasters could 
insist that they had issued warnings about 
the major disruptions of the past two dec-
ades, including COVID-19, and that policy-
makers failed to take appropriate action; to 
which policymakers would probably reply 
that these warnings were too vague and un-
specific in that they did not precisely pre-
dict what would happen where and when – 
a reference to the problem of gray swans. 
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But such back and forth will neither im-
prove preparations for future contingencies 
nor facilitate the policy uptake of analysts’ 
recommendations. Both the futures and 
the policymaking communities should aim 
to move beyond the blame game of “Why 
didn’t you warn us?” vs “We told you so!” 
In order to avoid disappointment, and 
to make the expected boost in demand 
sustainable, it is necessary to clearly com-
municate to policymakers the different 
goals for which various scientific methods 
of futures analysis aim. Foresight helps 
political authorities to structure thinking 
about the more distant future by raising 
awareness of emerging political, economic 
or social developments and the range of 
their possible impacts on international 
affairs. Sketching out possible mid- to long-
term futures requires methodological 
approaches, such as horizon scanning or 
trend analysis, that differ from those aim-
ing to predict the outcome of a concrete 
political event, for instance the result of an 
election that is scheduled for a specified 
date. Forecasting an election result can help 
policymakers to make more informed deci-
sions even under conditions of uncertainty. 
Here, quality criteria such as assessment 
accuracy and process transparency should 
be emphasized. 
Policymakers in turn should acknowl-
edge that setting priorities for preparations 
against hypothetical events and develop-
ments is not always a rational, evidence-
informed process in which subject matter 
expertise holds sway. Deciding which of the 
many possible risks in the future will take 
priority is an eminently political process. 
Precautionary policies require governments 
to make an investment, the costs of which 
depend on the nature of the threat that is 
prioritized. Investments in military capa-
bilities, for instance, are guided by com-
peting assessments of the most likely and 
pressing security challenges; e.g. should 
resources be spent on protection against 
territorial or cyber aggression? In this con-
text, it is then hard to avoid the resurfacing 
of one of the most basic questions of politi-
cal science: who gets what, when, how? 
How to Increase Policy Relevance 
The inherently political nature of determin-
ing priorities does not make futures analysis 
irrelevant. The question is, rather, how to 
make it politically significant while at the 
same time minimizing attempts at its 
malign politicization. Futures researchers 
will need to engage more frequently with 
politics to better understand daily routines 
and work requirements, including recog-
nition of the enormous amount of infor-
mation decision makers must process. 
Simply throwing more reports and studies 
about hypothetical events at policymakers 
does not automatically produce expected 
results, namely precautionary political 
intervention. To the contrary, knowledge 
overload can paralyze decision making 
processes and also provide a smokescreen 
that allows policymakers to deflect incon-
venient or unpopular measures that would 
mitigate future risks and threats. 
Therefore, the futures community must 
get better at processing information about 
futures’ contingencies. Structuring and 
curating futures should include pointing 
out which of the many conceivable events 
and developments might deserve special 
attention in political deliberations. Policy 
recommendations could be framed accord-
ing to the needs of different audiences in 
governments and parliaments: short-term 
forecasts of geopolitical events for the ex-
ecutive branch, and distant future implica-
tions of various scenarios for legislators. Of 
course, the process of inferring these policy 
recommendations must be based on trans-
parent criteria. 
Prediction accuracy should also be an im-
portant driver for policy relevance. Studies 
show that the accuracy of predictions can 
be systematically increased through prac-
tice and training. Analyzing a multi-year 
geopolitical forecasting tournament with 
several thousand participants, researchers 
found that some participants get it right 
significantly more often than others. About 
two percent put forth consistently accurate 
forecasts. When assigned to teams, the com-
bined accuracy of their forecasts improved 
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even more. Different cognitive styles, diver-
sity and multi-perspectivity were typical 
features of the best teams. They achieved 
about 30 percent higher prediction accu-
racy than competing teams that had access 
to classified information. 
Geopolitical Forecasts for the EU 
The EU could harvest this knowledge. Policy-
makers should insist that transparently gen-
erated predictions inform decisions as to 
which of the many conceivable events in 
the future should have priority. In the EU, 
an interinstitutional platform for a geo-
political forecast tournament could be orga-
nized for this purpose [I am indebted to 
Leopold Schmertzing for this idea]. Such 
a platform would help to identify the best 
forecasters among EU staff across all par-
ticipating institutions and without regard 
to professional status or seniority. Given 
its international composition and supra-
national identity, the EU could easily 
assemble teams characterized by various 
cognitive styles, diversity and multi-per-
spectivity, and then train them to improve 
their performance. As Vice-President of the 
European Commission for Interinstitutional 
Relations and Foresight, Maroš Šefčovič 
would be perfectly positioned to lead such 
an initiative. 
The executive branch of government 
would benefit from such a platform, as 
the following thought experiment demon-
strates. Predictions generated by the best 
forecasting teams on the probability of 
open military hostilities between Ukraine 
and Russia in the next six months, for 
example, would add additional assessments 
to the insights of intelligence agencies, 
diplomatic services and experts. Inserting 
information from a source that has a veri-
fiable track record of accuracy into policy 
debates on how to react to Russia’s aggres-
sive posture could help to make these 
debates more objective and evidence-
informed. 
In April 2020, the UK government be-
came one of the first to launch a geopoliti-
cal forecast tournament. Here, participating 
civil servants answer a broad range of ques-
tions based on publicly available informa-
tion, for example, about the probability of 
Chinese aggression against Taiwan and 
the rate of decline of COVID-19 infections 
worldwide. Because prediction accuracy can 
be judged against real-world outcomes, the 
best forecasters can easily be identified and 
assembled in teams tasked with specific 
missions. 
Better Policymaking in the Future 
Of course, the benchmark for this approach 
is not perfect anticipation of the future but 
rather better policymaking in the future. 
Predictions work best for hypothetical 
political events within a timeframe of 12 
months ahead. But the potential 30 percent 
higher forecast accuracy referred to above 
implies a considerable reduction of the 
number of short-term crises for which 
preparations should be taken immediately, 
thereby creating a decision making advan-
tage. Costly and awkward precautionary 
measures – such as military deployments, 
purchasing intensive care units, or wearing 
masks – could be more convincingly justi-
fied to crucial audiences, including political 
competitors, courts of auditors, the media 
and the general public. 
Given the limitations of short-term fore-
casting, foresight will remain instrumental 
as a method to structure thinking and pro-
duce plausible scenarios about develop-
ments the EU may face in the more distant 
future. Past reports produced by the Euro-
pean Strategy and Policy Analysis System 
(ESPAS) – a collaboration between some 
of the most important EU institutions – on, 
for example, “Challenges and Choices for 
Europe” until 2030, illustrate this approach. 
Scenarios tend to be more normatively 
charged than predictions of concrete politi-
cal events due to the longer time horizon 
that they cover. In a democratic regime, 
debates over different interpretations of the 
desirability of emerging futures typically 
fall within the domain of the legislative 
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branch of government. Hence, the obvious 
place for normative deliberations about 
these issues at the level of EU institutions is 
the European Parliament – the staunchest 
supporter of the idea of the Conference on 
the Future of Europe. 
It is therefore commendable that the 
European Parliamentary Research Service 
(EPRS) already has a strong focus on stra-
tegic and scientific foresight. Two features 
of the EPRS’s work stand out in this regard: 
its quality products – as acknowledged 
by the futures community – and its close 
interaction with experts, policymakers and 
legislators when designing inquiries. How-
ever, it would be highly desirable to further 
enlarge the range of futures expertise that 
is available to parliamentarians. Given a 
more uncertain world characterized by in-
creasing global connectivity, cross-sectoral 
interdependence, and declining political 
cohesion within the international commu-
nity, more rather than less informed debates 
and discussions on the geopolitical and nor-
mative aspects of the future are needed. 
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